Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Profit

May 28, 2008 - properties of revenue$maximizing mechanisms in a variety of ... of multiperiod procurement auctions for bidders whose cost ... The fund...

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Oct 18, 2010 - See also Krishna and Maenner (2001), Jehiel,. Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996, 1999), ... revenue equivalence fails and show that, in this case, efficient allocations can be im- plemented with a ... man (2010) uses linear programming a

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